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The primary intent of this paper is to discuss the
development and success of the national liberation movement
in Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands which has now
entered its fourteenth year.
A purpose so narrowly defined may strike the reader
as methodologically involving no more than a historical
narrative of the development of events in Guinea-Bissau and
the Cape Verde Islands over the last fourteen years. It may
also strike the reader as ignoring the specific colonial
context which was primarily responsible for the recent events,
and as neglecting the external situation which has been
favorable to the development of those events. The concerns
which are expressed here are. Indeed, legitimate for the
central questions they raise are: in what context can a
national liberation movement be discussed? What is the
relevance of the external situation for the success of recent
national liberation movements? Students of national libera¬
tion have to answer these questions or engage in meaningless
documentation of episodes.
It is the fundamental thesis of this paper that the
strategy of a national liberation movement must be based on
an objective understanding of the relations of forces between
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the main colonizer and the nationalists, and that under a
mass-based strategy and a favorable external situation the
relations of forces can be altered in favor of the nation¬
alists .
Underlying the above thesis are two important considera¬
tions (hypotheses) which are logically connected but must be
separately treated. How does one come to understand the
relations of forces between the colonizers and the national¬
ists? What is the nature of the external situation which is
favorable to the nationalists?
As the main purpose of colonialism (notwithstanding
such false and paternalistic assertions as "whlteman's
burden" or "civilizing mission") direct economic control and
exploitation, the nature of that exploitation determines the
super-structural relationships between the colonizer and the
colonial subjects, and as between the latter. The emergence
of a national petty bourgeoisie, which may later under
favorable conditions challenge the colonizer, is dictated by
the system of exploitation which the colonizer undertakes.
An understanding of the relations of forces between the
colonizer and the colonized would, therefore, at the very
least, involve an analysis of the economic exploitation which
is sanctioned by the colonizer and the social structure which
this has given rise to. Such an analysis may be designated
as a socio-economic analysis.
Further, while "the basic Marxist precept that
revolutions cannot be exported but must arise and develop
from absolutely necessary conditions within a country" is
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unalterable, it is equally important to recognize that "the
process of the world imperialist decline [is being] hastened
by the fact that by this time the socialist system has become
greatly strengthened and [is] in a better position to give
assistance to many revolutionary forces in many countries."^
Consequently, while paying particular attention to the
specific conditions within a given country, a student of
national liberation must also take into account the external
situation which contributes to the growth of the national
liberation movements of recent years.
Given the nature of the considerations (hypotheses)
outlined above, the national liberation movement in Guinea-
Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands will be discussed under two
major chapters. The first chapter will highlight how the
Portuguese controlled and economically exploited Guinea and
the Cape Verde Islands and the pattern of social relation¬
ships which they brought into being. This chapter will be
introduced by sketching certain geographical features of
Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. The second, and main,
chapter will take the form of a brief examination of the
external situation and a description of the strategy through
which Guinean and Cape Verdian nationalism operates.
i
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For additional readings on the role of socialist
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The limitations of such a study are reasonably apparent.
It is limited by the available materials which are secondary
and mostly patchy, but nevertheless useful and valuable. It
is also limited by the fact that the national liberation
movement in Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands is still
in progress, and that an over-all appraisal of the strategy
adopted therein is rendered difficult, while the projection
of the outcome of the movement is still possible, based on
the relations of forces that have been altered in favor of
the nationalists.
So far, no attempt has been made to provide defini¬
tions. The term "national liberation movement" is somewhat
economically-oriented and tightly used. It is a known fact
that colonialism (which is the direct control of productive
forces) diverts peoples from the right of following their
natural historical path and thereby impedes their development.
Hence, as used in this paper, "national liberation movement"
refers to the democratic movement of an organized colonial
people who seek to free the processes of their productive
forces. As Amllcar Cabral put it for Guineans and Cape
Verdians,
the basis of national liberation, whatever
the formulas adopted on the level of inter¬
national law, is the inalienable right of
every people to have their own history, and
the objective of national liberation is to
regain this right usurped by imperialism,
that is to say, to free the process of devel¬
opment of the national productive forces.^
Amllcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, trans. and ed.
by Richard Handyside (New York, 1969), p. 102.
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For the purpose of this paper, "strategy" is defined
as the over-all military, economic, social and political plan
which is designed, implemented, directed and controlled by
the vanguard nationalist party for the achievement of the
goals of a national liberation movement. By "relations of
forces that can be altered in favor of the nationalists" is
generally meant those colonial subjects who do not partake
in the economic gains of the colonialists and may, under
certain formulas which take into account the concrete reality
of the former, be mobilized by the vanguard nationalist party
for the achievement of the goals of national liberation and
the ‘liquidation of colonialism.
CHAPTER I
HOW THE PORTUGUESE CONTROLLED AND EXPLOITED
GUINEA AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS AND
THE PATTERN OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
WHICH THEY BROUGHT INTO BEING
How the Portuguese came into contact with the Cape
Verde Islands and mainland Guinea and controlled them is a
matter of historical Importance and an examination of it is
useful to provide background information on the relations
of forces which prepared the ground for Portuguese economic
exploitation. An examination of the economic exploitation
will, in addition to portraying the objective conditions
that provided the basis for the national liberation movement,
contribute to the understanding of the supra-structural rela¬
tionships to which it gave rise. Further, an analysis of
the pattern of social relationships which Portuguese colonial¬
ism brought into existence is not only useful to show the
contradictions Inherent in that pattern, but will also show
those sectors of the colonial society which, under a given
nationalist strategy, could be mobilized to engage in the
national liberation movement.
While the logical connection between the foregoing
points is clear, their individual importance justifies their
separate treatment along the sequence in which they are
presented. Before, however, engaging in a section-by-section
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discussion of the foregoing points. It appears logical and
useful to have some understanding of the geography of the
terrain, which Is after all the physical frame of reference
for the entire discussion.
On an African map, Guinea-Bissau^ figures where West
Africa budges Into the Atlantic Ocean. Sandwiched between
Senegal In the north and the Republic of Guinea In the south,
2
and roughly two-thirds the size of Portugal, Guinea comprises
3
an area of 13,948 square miles.
A row of Islands and archipelagoes extend the terri¬
torial realm of Guinea Into a considerable portion of the
Atlantic Ocean. The Islands, which are about 300 miles off
the west coast of Africa, are generally referred to as the
Cape Verde Islands, and the archipelagoes are the Bljagos
archipelagoes.
Guinea has navigable rivers—for example, the Farlm,
the Coruba and Geba rivers are navlgable^--whlch possess a
natural and elaborate network of canals that Intersect them.^
Lying In the estuary of the Geba river, Bissau Is the largest
^Klnara, "Glnala" In Portuguese, Is expected to be the
name that would be adopted after Independence. See I. William
Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War; Portuguese Guinea," Africa
Report, 9 (February, 1964), 10.
^Ronald H. Chllcote, Portuguese Africa (New Jersey,
1967), p. 83.
''Gerard Challand, Armed Struggle In Africa, trans. by
David Rattray and Robert Leonhardt (New York and London,
1969) , p. 3.
^Challand, 0£. clt., p. 3.
^Chllcote, o£. clt., p. 91.
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Island port and colonial capital of Guinea.^ Owing to the
navigable rivers, the national liberation movement has been
to a considerable extent amphibious In nature.^
Situated In a zone of rainy tropical climate, the
greater part of Guinea Is periodically Innundated by tidal
0
water. The rainy season runs from June to November and the
dry season from December to May.^ The rich swampy alluvial
districts are particularly suited for growing rice. The rainy
season has proved to be of considerable tactical Importance to
liberation forces: while the rainy season does not allow the
Portuguese to use airplanes to attack liberation forces. It
has permitted the latter to launch calculated ground offen¬
sives .
Guinea has some distinctive territorial features. The
north-eastern region comprises low table lands; the southern
region comprises coastal plains; and a rich timber forest
covers the center.^® The forest, which affords a hospitable
shelter for the liberation forces, has also proved to be of
enormous tactical Importance.
^Ibld.
^John Blggs-Davlson, "The Current Situation In
Portuguese Guinea," African Affairs, 70, 281 (October, 1971),
385.
8
Chllcote, o£_. clt. . p. 80.
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Challand, o£_. clt. . p. 3.
10 Ibid.
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Historically, Guinea was part of the ancient Ghana
11
empire. With the decline of the Ghana empire in the
eleventh century, the Mandingos, a Guinean tribe, established
the "Mandlnga Empire of Mall" which flourished between the
12
thirteenth and fifteenth century. By the eighteenth century,
the Fulas, another Guinean tribe, were converted to Islam and
they enslaved the Mandingos and the allied tribes of the
13Beafada whom they in turn converted to Islam. Although
mainland Guinea had many tribes, the Cape Verde Islands, lying
some 300 miles off the West Coast of Africa, were apparently
uninhabited until the fifteenth century.
Portuguese mariners made their first contact with
Africa in 1444-5, when they reached the Cape Verde Islands
and shortly afterwards established there bases for trade
leading toward the Interior of West Africa.With the parti¬
cipation of the Fepels, a Bissau tribe, the Portuguese seized
Africans and took them to work as slaves.From the time of
their arrival until the sixteenth century, the Portuguese
11
Chllcote, o£^, cit. , p. 89.
12 Ibid.
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Biggs-Davison, 0£. cit. , p. 386.
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Ronald H. Chllcote, "The Political Thought of Amllcar
Cabral," The Journal of Modern African Studies. 6, 3 (1968),
373.
^^Ronald Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of
Africa (2nd edition, Maryland, 1966), p. 114.
^^Chaliand, op., cit. , p. 4.
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became the chief slave traders in West Africa, They either
took Africans to the Cape Verde Islands and to Brazil which
they owned, or else they sold them to Spanish settlers in
South America, Mexico, Central America and the Carribean
18
Islands. As the Portuguese traders settling in the Cape
19
Verde Islands were short of Portuguese women, they mated
with African women from the Pepel, Balante, Bijago and
Mandlgo tribes and it is this miscegenation which the
Portuguese officially cite as being supportive of their
dubious theory of "lustroplcology.At any rate, this
explains why today Africans on the Cape Verde Islands tend
to be descendants of the Pepel, Balante, Bijago and Mandingo
21
tribes, although most of the Inhabitants are mulattos.
It must be noted, however, that other than establish¬
ing some coastal trading posts, colonizing the Cape Verde
Islands and undertaking to the fullest extent their notorious
slave-trading enterprises, the Portuguese did not rule in the
territory which was later--in the latter part of the nineteenth
^^Walter Rodney, West Africa and the Atlanta Slave
Trade (Africa Research Groups, Reprint 6), p. 4.
^®Cf. Ibid.
^^Dependency and Underdevelopment Consequences of
Portugal in Africa (The Research Group for the Liberation of
Portuguese Africa, California, 1971), p. 12.
^®As posited by a Brazilian sociologist^ Gilberto
Freyre, the theory maintain the myth of racial harmony and
cultural integration of Portuguese with Africans. See Adriano
Moreira, Portugal’s Stand in Africa (New York, 1962), pp. 145-
66.
For a demonstration where the myth of "lustropicology
broke down in "Portuguese Guinea," see pp. 16-18 of this thesis.
21
Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. cit., pp. 90-91,
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century—-to become "Portuguese Guinea." The character of
Portuguese presence in West Africa did, however, change
because of the French who colonized Senegal around the middle
of the nineteenth century and also temporarily, for strategic
reasons, occupied the Cape Verde Islands in 1857. The
scramble-for-Africa Congress of Berlin in 1884-5 did also
pose considerable challenge to Portugal’s Ineffective claim
to sovereignty over Guinea, As customary international law
[which is actually a western imperialist legal norm] makes
a valid claim to sovereignty over a territory contingent upon
the effective control of that territory, it was obvious that
Portugal, which did not control Guinea, could not establish
its claim. Nevertheless, largely by a British support against
French advance, a Luso-French convention of 1886 allocated to
Portugal the territory which is designated on maps as "Portu¬
guese Guinea.
A little before and soon after the British rescued the
threatened and challenged claim of Portugal, the latter set
out to conquer mainland Guinea with superior weapons. The
indigenous Guinea people, did, however, put up considerable
and long resistance against Portugal. Notable among the
resisting tribes were the Balantes, a segmentary society,
24who fought the Portuguese, off and on, well into the 1920's.
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Oliver and Page, op^. cit. , p. 195.
■^Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guine (Baltimore
and London, 1969), p. 22.
^^Basil Davidson, The African Genius (Boston-Toronto
and London, 1969), p. 249.
7
Although the Balantes were subdued In the 1920's, It was not
until 1936, about half a century after the Portuguese launched
their conquest against the interior of Guinea, that the Bijagos
of the Bisago Archipelagoes surrendered their traditional
weapons.Furthermore, even though 1936 marked the date of
the breakdown of indigenous resistance, there still remained
pockets of "Portuguese Guinea" where the Portuguese had
2 6
spasmodic hold and could not extract colonial taxes.
As, however, Portugal had broken down the resistance
put up against it, it was capable of establishing its brand
of colonialism on Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. How
the Portuguese established their colonial administration,
which was obviously favorable to the suppression and exploi¬
tation of its colonized people and territory will be discussed
below. One may merely hasten to point out that Portugal
found active support in its colonial administration from
mulattos and Islamlzed Black chiefs to the degree that the
economic and social colonial structure of Guinea was not
relatively (i.e. in contrast to the rest of the indigenous
population) biased against them.
Because of its backwardness, the economy of Guinea
was unindustrallzed and was entirely based on traditional
agriculture and animal husbandry. While ground kernels,
vegetable oils, rice, maize, cotton and sugar cane comprised
2 S
Chaliand, ££. clt., p. 4.
^^Luis Cabral, "'Portuguese' Guinea: United Front
Against Imperialism," Tricontinental, 15 (November-December
1969), 145.
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the main agricultural produce, sheep, goats, and pigs Included
most of the livestock.
In Guinea, Portugal did not, as It for Instance did In
Angola, create agricultural companies of the European type
2 8
by displacing masses of Africans In order to settle Europeans.
The Guinean peasantry was allowed to own and to cultivate
the land and to raise animals. The relative absence of forced
labor, "except for the seasonal needs of district administra¬
tors who required roads to be cleared or gardens to be
weeded,and the fact that Guineans were allowed to own and
to cultivate the land and to raise animals did not, however,
altogether leave them Immune from exploitation, although the
form of exploitation was largely seml-feudal and Indirect.
Guineans who had to compulsorily supply Portuguese markets,
at enormously low rates, with groundnuts, palm oil, coconuts,
rice,wood, rubber, wax, hides, and oil cakes were—quite
apart from satisfying the annual payment of taxes which had
caused extreme penury--lndlrectly exploited by Portugal"
through trade, through the differences between the prices
^^chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. clt., p. 91.
2 8
Amllcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," In Portuguese
Colonies; Victory of Death (3rd ed., Cuba, April 1971), p.l44.
^^Davldson, The Liberation of Gulne, op. clt., p. 26,
Challand, £2.. clt. at p. 16 strengthens the same point by
Indicating that
In ’Portuguese Guinea,’ forced labour was
used on a relatively small scale, chiefly
In road construction and malntenance--ln
contrast to Angola where Portuguese Imposed
the obligation of working on the European
plantations.
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and the real value of the products."^® More specifically,
responsible for this Indirect form of exploitation were
Portuguese enterprises which were later affiliated with non-
Portuguese companies.
A giant among the Portuguese enterprises Is the
Companhla Unlao Fabrll (CUF) which belongs to the Portuguese
31
Melo family and was founded at the turn of the century.-'
The CUF started with agriculture and moved on to textiles,
copper, sulfates, sulfuric acid, steel, and ship construc¬
tion; It owns a private merchant fleet, whole Industries,
and Is In turn linked by marriage to one of Portugal's
major finance groups, the Champallmaud family, which has a
virtual monopoly on Portuguese steel Industry, Itself
virtually under West German control.The CUF holds joint
Interests with a number of West German, French and U. S.
firms. This Is attested to by the fact that In 1962, the
CUF entered Into a contractual agreement with the Soclete
Francalse d' Etudes et de Flnancements Industrlels whereby
It would provide raw materials for the Installation and con¬
struction of new plants, some of them In Guinea, particularly
33
for the chemical and textile branches of the enterprise.
France and West Germany advanced credits of about $420,000
to the CUF during the first months of 1963, an occasion
30
Amllcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," In Portuguese
Colonies; Victory or Death, op. clt. , pp. 144-45.
^^Challand, 0£^. clt. , pp. 134-35.
32Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 135
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which the latter took to establish a new company in conjunc¬
tion with the American firm, the Ludlow Corporation: Sociedade
de Industrias Texteis do Norte-SENTOR (Textiles Industries
Corporation of the North).Ranking secQnd to the CUE in
the import-export business is the Sociedade Commercial
35
Ultramarina (Overseas Commercial Corporation). Possessing
warehouses, modern rice-thrashing plants, as well as oil
extraction and soap factories, the Overseas Commercial
Corporation had activities which extended well into certain
portions of the interior of Guinea.According to the 1948
report of the Banco Nacional TJltramino (BNU) , one of the
major Portuguese monopolist banks which exercised monopoly
control over all banking activity in Guinea,the Overseas
Commercial Corporation owned an industrial complex in the
industrial section of Bissau, with separate plants for the
hulling of rice and peanut and the extraction of vegetable
3 8
oils. The Sociedade Anonlma Concesslonarla de RefInacao
de Petroleos, a firm which was founded in 1938 and has mono¬
poly of oil refining in Portugal, is known to have set up new
oil storage facilities, at Bandlm (Bissau), over a surface
of 20,000 square meters.Other enterprises of Major




^^Ibid.. PP . 132-34
^®Ibid. , P- 137.
39ibid. , P • 136.
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Guinea Include the Companhla da Borracha da Guine, CABORNEL
(Guinea Rubber Company), the Antonio Silva Corporation, the
Companhla Lusltana do Alumlno da Guine e Angola and the Esso
Exploration Guinea, Inc. The Guinea Rubber Company, whose
objective was the exploitation of Guinea's rubber resources,
owned factories which began to operate toward the end of
1957, furnishing raw material for FABOPOL-Fabrica Portuguesa
de Borracha, upon which CABORNEL is dependent.The Companhla
Lusltana do Alumlno da Guine e Angola, whose objective was
the discovery and processing of bauxites, was founded on
August 16, 1957 under the terms of a contract signed on
March 7, 1957, between the Portuguese government and the
Dutch Billiton Maatschappij N.V.^^ Finally, founded in 1958,
the Esso Exploration Guinea, Inc. is affiliated with the
Standard Oil of New Jersey and its agent, the Corporation
Trust Company of America.While by a March 1958 contract
Esso obtained a concession to prospect for and exploit oil
throughout Guinea, a March 1966 complementary contract per¬
mitted Esso to "also undertake prospecting, drilling, and
exploitation of any other mineral.
Though Portugal has not found its industrial as well






profitable proposition,^^ except from the military point of
view, it is significant to note that Portugal had virtually
sealed off its colonies from economic relations with other
imperialist nations prior to the emergence of nationalist
A A
With half of the country controlled by the
PAIGC, comprehensive statistics for the Guinean
economy have been unavailable during the past
few years. However, the monthly bulletin of
Portugal's National Institute for Statistics
gives some Interesting Information. In 1959,
Guinea and Cape Verde supplied 16.3 percent of
Portugal's colonial imports; in 1963, 11.5 per¬
cent; and in 1964, 9.8 percent. Portuguese
exports to Guinea and Cape Verde went down from
12.1 percent in 1959 to 10.7 percent in 1963
and 10.2 percent in 1964.
According to the PAIGC, the Companhla Uniao
Fabril has had to close most of its stores in the
regions that have not yet been liberated, and
several of its boats have been seized along with
their cargoes. The Overseas Trading Company has
given up all of its Guinean business, in the
bushlands as well as the towns. Billiton
Maatshapplj N.V., the Dutch Company which holds
a concession for mining the Boe bauxite deposits,
has been forced to suspend its exploratory
operations because of PAIGC activity. Challand,
op. cit., p. 10.
Furthermore with about three-fourth of Guinea-Bissau
controlled by the PAIGC, all the Portuguese and the inter¬
national business Involvement has been completely frustrated.
See Southern Africa, 4,10 (December, 1971), 9. However,
To the American petroleum giant Exxon (formerly
Esso) at least, Spanola offered a sufficient
sense of security for its risk by renewing for
three years its contract for oil exploration
with a coastal concession of over 3700 square
miles. Encouraged by the results of its
earlier exploration (at the cost of $30 million
since 1966), Exxon followed the lead of Gulf in
Cabinda and several American oil companies seek¬
ing concession along the Angolan coast, in betting
on the Portuguese retaining political power in
Africa (and thus help them to do so). John Marcum,
"Amllcar Cabral: The Meaning of an assassination,"
Africa Report (March-April 1973), 22.
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movements. It was with a view to defend her colonial
possessions in Africa that Salazar allied Portugal with the
NATO imperialist powers which it joined in 1959.^^ And it
is for the same reason that Portugal's government recently
extended facilities for non-Portuguese capital for the
exploitation of its colonial resources. In return, the major
NATO powers, notably the United States, West Germany, France,
England, Canada, Belgium and Italy have continued to actively
support Portuguese colonial war efforts through military
training and by supplying war material and financial assis¬
tance. Cabral notes that Portugal has thus been able
to use every kind of bomb save the nuclear ones.
In particular, they have used napalm bombs
against [the Guinean population] since the
beginning of the war. They also used
armored cars. They used B-26, T-6, and
P-2V planes and fighter jets - Fiat 82s
Fiat 91s and sabres supplied by Canada
through Federal Germany, etc. None of
it worked. Lately they have been using
armed helicopters for combined operations
with the navy and infantry. We are sure
they will not work either.
In December 1971, the United States further dramatized its
solid support for Portugal by granting it close to half a
billion dollars for use of the strategic Azores bases.
Even very recently.
45
James Duffy. Portugal in Africa (Massachusetts, 1962),
p. 206.
^^Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, o£^. cit. . p. 140.
^^For a discussion of this unprecedented dollar commit¬
ment, see Gil Fernandes, "The Azores over Africa." Africa
Today, 19, 1 (Winter, 1972), 3-6; Hon. Charles C. Diggs,
Jr., "U. S. Policy Toward Africa," Congressional Record,
118, 1 (Washington); and "Azores Agreement," African Agenda,
1, 2 (April, 1972), 1-2.
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One of the places to which Gaetano could still
turn for help was the United States. Hence
the importance for him of following up the
Azores base accord of December 1971 with addi¬
tional financial and diplomatic support.
Accordingly, in tune with the Nixon doctrine
and its reliance on strategic retrenchment in
island bases, Lisbon began pushing a well-worn
Salazarist proposal: creation of a South
Atlantic defense pact including the United
States, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. In
addition to the Azores, Portugal might then cash
in on Sao Tome, the Naderas and even the Bljagos
Islands just off the Guinea-Bissau coast.
Since the military strategic design of Portugal and
the concomittant international business involvement and the
latter’s failure are recent developments, they should not
obscure the fact that Portugal’s past exploitation was, so
far as it concerned over 95% of the population of Guinea
[which was made up of the peasantry] was largely semi-feudal
and indirect. In this connection, it should be pointed out
that Portugal did not allocate but a negligible amount of
money to improve or expand agriculture.^^
Agricultural production, the sole basis of
the economy of Guine, [was] founded on the
mono-cultivation of groundnuts. The failure
of the economic plans of Portugal has resulted
in mass emigration to Senegal and the Republic
of Guinea. The situation is very similar in
the Cabo Verde Islands. Thousands are unem¬
ployed and nearly 10,000 people died of famine
in 1968-9. This was the result of so-called
agricultural ’crisis’. Between 1942 and
1947, 30,000 to 40,000 people died as a result
of similar famines in the Cabo Verde Islands
alone.
^®Marcum, ££^. cit. , p. 23.
^^Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. cit. , p. 94.
^^Race Today, 3, 11 (November, 1971), 378.
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Nor had Portugal done much in the construction of schools
and educational facilities, control of endemic diseases,
and urban-rural sanitatlon.While on the educational
plane only one percent of the population could claim literacy,
the medical sphere was equally markedly poor as this Is
evidenced by the fact that there was only one doctor per
c 9
100,000 Guineans. The preceding figures do not obviously
tell the fact that the rural Guinean population did not
practically have access to any doctors or schools, both of
which were stationed in towns. It was this continuing under¬
development and mass misery which constituted the objective
factors that prompted the nationalists to pursue independence
and development through a violent national liberation move¬
ment .
It has already been indicated that in the absence of
industrialization, the economy of Guinea was based entirely
on traditional agriculture and animal husbandry. It has
further been noted that, as Portugal itself is an under¬
developed country (by the standards of other imperialist
nations), it could not foster the development of industriali¬
zation or even exploit the natural resources (oil, bauxite)
of Guinea. To be sure, the Portuguese government's recent
extension of facilities of non-Portuguese capital for the
exploitation of its colonial resources was motivated by
^^Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, op. cit. . p. 92.
^^Race Today, 3, 11, (November, 1971), 378.
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considerations of defense of Its colonial possessions as the
result of the emergence of nationalist movements. Aside
from the fact that In Guinea, Portugal's Industrial and the
International business Involvement has met with failure, what
this fundamentally means Is that Portugal was not In a posi¬
tion to significantly alter the basic economic structure of
Guinea. Given the traditional economic structure of Guinea,
there was no possibility for the rise of a large working
class. The Implication from the latter point Is that the
national liberation movement could not be based on the
working class but on the peasantry that was almost the whole
of the Guinean population and was responsible for producing
the nation's wealth.
At any rate, since Portugal's exploitation was merely
directed at the traditional agricultural sector, and was
seml-feudal In nature, Portugal had to create a social struc¬
ture which was appropriate to this form of exploitation.
As the social structure of Guinea has changed tremen¬
dously owing to the national liberation movement, the
following account will give a more or less modest picture
of the social situation In Guinea prior to the movement.
Guinea had a population of about 800,000 and was made
up of various ethnic groups, the major ones being the
Balantea, followed In order by the Mandjaks, the Fulas, the
Mandlngos, the Pepels, the Hancags or Brames, the Felups and
the Bljagos. The other less numerous ethnic groups Included
^^Challand, o£^. clt. , p. 12.
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the Beafadas, the Balrotes, the Cassangas, the Banhuns, the
54
Sarakolles, the Pajadlncas and the Cape Verdians.
As Portugal did not displace masses of Africans In
order to settle Europeans, as It did In Angola, there was
not a comparatively staggering number of Portuguese In Guinea.
As a point of Illustration, It Is significant to note that
In 1960 there were only some 3,000 Portuguese civilians In
c e
the five towns of Guinea. Although the Portuguese living
In Guinea were small In number, Portugal nevertheless managed
to control Guineans by using the following strategy. Signi¬
ficantly enough, an examination of this strategy will show
where the myth of "lusotroplcology” broke down In Guinea.
The Portuguese, first of all, saw themselves as
messengers of "Western European civilization." To the degree
that Cape Verdian mulattos had European blood In them,
Portugal considered them as "assimilated"; and to reinforce
their "assimilation," which necessarily meant abdication of
African values, some of the mulattos were allowed to pursue
European education. Next to the Portuguese residing In
Guinea, employment opportunities were tendered to Guinean
mulattos. Though small In number, this class of "assimilated"
mulattos, which had relatively more access to education as
part of the unique Portuguese policy of "overseas provinces,"





government clerks and small traders. With respect to the
African Guineans, who were considered inferior by reason of
their color, Portugal found it wise to keep them ignorant
and to utilize to its advantage the traditional social con¬
tradictions which existed among their tribal social structures.
For example, while Portugal recognized the authority of the
tribal chiefs, it used these same chiefs to indirectly rule
the Black population. Common to both the Cape Verdian
mulattos and Black chiefs was the fact that they were both
used as ruling agents of Portugal and had to obey a
Portuguese-contrived strategy which they never had a role in
making. But to the extent that the Portuguese kept them¬
selves above the mulattos and the mulattos above the African
chiefs, they were able to win the support of the former two
categories. On the other hand, the masses of Guinean
peasants, the "objects" of Portugal's exploitation, were
suppressed through various harsh laws^^ which deprived them
of civil liberties and ultimately Incapacitated them from
determining their political destiny.
The following brief analysis of the social situation
in Guinea, in terms of the rural and urban social structure
will not only strengthen the observations made thus far, but
will also shed light on those sectors of the Guinean society
which stood in support of the national liberation movement.
C £
^"Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. cit. , p. 91.
^^Dependency and Underdevelopment Consequences of
Portugal in Africa, op. cit. , p. 13.
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The absence of Portuguese or mulattos in rural areas
limits the analysis of the rural social structure of Guinea
to the various indigenous tribal groups which inhabited
those areas. As has already been indicated, Guinea's rural
areas were inhabited by many ethnic or tribal groups. While
an analysis of each ethnic group would appear desirable and
necessary for the presentation of a complete picture of the
rural social situation, such group-by-group analysis is,
however, rendered Impossible by the absence of materials on
each ethnic group. Nevertheless, a general analysis of the
social situation in rural Guinea is still possible and can
be done by an analysis of the representative ethnic groups.
Inspite of obvious tribal and linguistic divisions,
there were two important distinguishable tribal groups in
the rural areas: on the one hand, there were the moslem,
semi-feudal group represented by the Fulas, and on the
other hand, there were an anlmlst group which had no defined
58
form of state organization, represented by the Balantes.
The Mandjaks who were anlmlsts and semi-feudal are generally
considered to be an intermediate or transitional group
C Q
between the two main groups. A brief analysis of each
group is offered below.
The Fula tribe, which was quite close to the Mandlgo
tribe allowed private ownership of land and maintained a
5 8
Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op. cit. . p. 56.
^^Ibid., p. 56.
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land-lord-tenant type relationship. The tribe functioned
under a system of customary chieftaincy and had a well-defined
social hierarchy. On the higher echelon of the tribe were
60
the chiefs, the nobles and religious figures. In the middle
of the hierarchy figured artisans and Dyulas, who were Itiner¬
ant traders.®^ At the base of the hierarchy were peasants
who depended on the chiefs and were In turn exploited by the
latter for whom they were obliged to work during a certain
part of the year. In the Fula tribe, women were prevented
from owning what they produced and were to a certain extent
regarded as the property of their husbands.The Portuguese
did not upset the super-structure created by the social and
economic conditions of the Fula and the closely similar
Mandlngo tribes. On the contrary, while they maintained the
given social and economic structure of the Fula and Mandlngo
tribes, they created a league with the chiefs and their
entourages and maintained Indirect domination over the rest
of the rural tribes.As would be expected, the chiefs
were not only against the Idea of national liberation, but
were also responsible for dissuading the Fula and Mandlngo
peasants from joining the national liberation movement. While
®°Ibld.; Challand, op. clt. , p. 14.





It is now believed that the chiefs have, because of the
extension of the liberated zones, placed themselves under the
protection of the losing colonial authorities,^^ the Fula and
Mandingo peasants, who were at first reluctant to join the
liberation movement, have, in the course of time, been per-
suaded to join the rank and file of the liberation forces.
In sharp contrast to the Fula and Mandingo tribes,
the Balante tribe considered property and land as belonging
to the village, although the products of agriculture as well
as the instruments of production were used and controlled by
each family in order to maintain its subsistence.^^ In the
Balante tribe, there was no ambition to rise above the group,
as this would be tantamount to becoming separated from it.^^
Unlike the Fulas, the Balantes had family and age-grades as
the basis of their social organization.^^ The Council of
Elders, which constituted the social authority of each
Balante village, regulated the distribution of land and
settled daily disputes.^® Among the Balantes, women parti¬
cipated in production and owned what they produced; and this
gave the Balante women a fairly freer position than their
^^Chaliand, o£^. cit. . p. 16.
^^Ibid.. pp. 16-18.
^^Cabral. The Revolution in Guinea, op. cit. , p. 57.
6 8
Challand, op., cit. . p. 17.
6 9
Ibid. , p. 13; Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op.
cit. , p. 57.
^Qlbid.
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counterpart in the Fula tribe.Since the system of chief¬
taincy was alien to the Balantes* and the Balantes had
maintained their tradition of resistance to colonial
penetration, they were the first tribe to accept the idea
72
of national liberation and to be massively involved in it.
As has already been stated, the Mandjaks constituted
a transitional group between the Islamlzed semi-feudal Fulas
and the animist "stateless" Balantes. As anlmists, the
Handjaks maintained the age-grade system, but like the
Islamlzed groups, they had a clergy Invested with religious
and political functions, and their group was more or less
socially and economically stratified along the lines of the
Fulas.Although the Mandjaks peasants were held back at
the outset by their leaders who were in league with the
Portuguese, they also quickly joined the national liberation
74movement.'
Portuguese civilians. Cape Verdlans and Guinean
Africans lived side by side in Bissau, Bafata, Blssoura,
Mansoa and Boloma, the five Important towns of Guinea.
The Portuguese could be subdivided into senior
officials and managers who made a group Isolated from the









p. 61; Challand, op.
pp. 17-18.
, Revolution in Guinea
cit., p. 14.
op. cit. , p. 58.
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were followed by middle-class officials, small traders, clerks,
7 6
professional men. And below the latter figured skilled
workers.In terms of the Idea of national liberation move¬
ments, the Portuguese most bitterly opposed were the skilled
workers, while some "sympathy" was shown by the upper-class
7 8
Portuguese.‘
In the Cape Verdian urban scene, there were a handful
of high officials which the Portuguese used as Instruments
79
of Indirect domination.
In the African Guinean urban scene, there were a small
number of wage labourers (examples: dockworkers, stevedores,
mechanics, repairers of workshops) which was followed by the
lumpenproletarlat (example: layabouts, prostitutes); and
finally the mobile young folks who had contacts In both the
80
urban and rural milieu. While the lumpenproletarlat had
been helpful to the Portuguese police as Informers, the wage
labourers (or call It the nascent proletariat class) and the
mobile young folks, from whose group was drawn and trained
the first political activists, have proved to be extremely
81
dynamic In the national liberation movement.
76ibld.
^^Ibld. . pp. 61-62.
^^Challand, o£. clt.. p. 19.
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Cabral, Revolution In Guinea, op. clt. , p. 62.
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Ibid, ; According to Challand, op. clt. , pp. 20-21,
the mobile young folks belonged neither to wage-labourers nor
to the lumpenproletarlat, and had no definite profession.
They occasionally worked or lived with the support of relatives
23a
with whom they lived. This group was sensitive to colonialism
and had turned out to be particularly mobilizable in the
struggle.
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It is Interesting, as it might perhaps appear racially
paradoxical to note that it was from the petty bourgeois
mulatto intelligentsia class that the idea of the hitherto
successful national liberation movement sprang. While one
can easily dismiss the racial paradox by asserting that "the
African blood circulating in the revolutionary mulattos was
much stronger and unyielding to the myth of European superi¬
ority," such a treatment would naturally ignore the economic,
social and political basis of their anti-colonial stand.
Academician Y. Zhukov notes that
Under a colonial regime the local national
intelligentsia [we might add "irrespective
of its racial origin"] either finds very
restricted opportunities for applying its
skills or else is simply unable to make an
Independent living. Before the winning of
political Independence, the apparatus of
government [is] staffed mainly by colonial
officials from the metropoly. Local members
of the intelligentsia have to be satisfied
with minor posts in the civil service.
It is only natural that the national
intelligentsia should take a most active
part in the liberation struggle: only
victory over the colonialists and the
achievement of national independence would
make for large-scale employment of national
cadres in the Intellectual sphere and assure
them a livelihood.
The confession of Amilcar Cabral, who was one of the most
outstanding authors of the Guinean national liberation move¬
ment, but who otherwise was racially mixed, bears out the
truth of Zhukov’s point. This is what the former had to say:
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Academician Y. Zhukov, "Driving Forces of the
National-Liberation Revolutions," in The Third World,
op. cit., p. 50.
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To take my own case as a member of the petty
bourgeois group which launched the struggle
in Guinea, I was an agronomist working under
a European who everybody knew was one of the
biggest idiots in Guinea; I could have taught
him his job with my eyes shut but he was the
boss: this is something which counts a lot,
this is the confrontation which really matters.
This is of major Importance when considering
when the Initial idea of the struggle came
from.83
Cabral also notes that while Ignorance generally keeps the
peasantry politically unaware of its economic wretchedness
(which therefore necessitates more political education), the
workers constitute a more active national liberation force
than the peasantry and that this is a function of the economic,
social and political situation. To make a direct quotation
from Cabral:
In Guinea the peasants are subjected to a
kind of exploitation equivalent to slavery;
but even if you try and explain to them
that they are being exploited and robbed,
it is difficult to convince them by means
of unexperienced explanation of a technico-
economlc kind that they are the most
exploited people; whereas it is easier to
in the towns who earn, say, 10 escudos a day
for a i ob in which a European earns between .
30 and 50 that they are being subjected to
massive exploitation and injustice, because
they can see. (Emphasis added)
To be sure, it was the Bissau dockworkers who, under the gui¬
dance of the petty bourgeois social strata, ssittriick for the
Improvement of their economic conditions and suffered the
83
Cabral, Revolutions in Guinea. op > clt.. p. 63.
®^Ibid.
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heaviest losses®^ before any such demands were made by the
peasantry.
How the Cape Verdian petty bourgeois social strata
altered the relations of forces In favor of a national demo
cratlc movement will be treated after a preliminary examlna
tlon of the external situation.
85 See p. 41 of this thesis
CHAPTER II
A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE EXTERNAL SITUATION
AND THE STRATEGY THROUGH WHICH GUINEAN
AND CAPE VERDIAN NATIONALISM OPERATES
It would be wrong to expect that present day national
liberation movements are not receiving external material
assistance or are Insulated from the Impact of external
revolutionary Ideological Influence. It would be equally
wrong to expect that any external help and Influence, however
strong, can liquidate a colonial system. On the other hand,
the destruction of a colonial system that strives to maintain
Its continued existence requires a favorable external situa¬
tion and more crucially It requires a strategically sound and
calculated action by a united colonial people with a vanguard
political party as the leading force In the national libera¬
tion movement. The clear linkage between the external and
the Internal situation (l.e. the particular colonial context
In a given country) will no doubt be clear with a brief
examination of the external situation and the strategy through
which Guinean and Cape Verdian nationalism operates^
At present the colonialist form of Imperialism claims
over less than 4 percent of the globe’s territory and 1.1
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percent of the earth's population.^ The most obvious gener¬
alization that can be made about the decline of colonialism
is that its disintegration was brought about under two forms
of nationalist struggles. The first, and which may be
characterized as 'peaceful ways' Included general strikes,
mass demonstrations, and organized political agitation which
was undertaken by the colonials and brought to bear on the
weakened colonial system that had suffered from "two world
wars" (call it imperialist wars).
The countries of Tanzania, Mall, Guinea
(Conakry), Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Congo
(Brazavllle), Nigeria and others, large
or small, separated themselves from
colonial rule in these ways.^
The second "non-peaceful way" which forcibly liquidated
colonialism, and is gaining increasing prominence in recent
national liberation movements, is through armed guerrilla
struggle of a united colonial people with a vanguard poli¬
tical party as the leading force in the national liberation
movement. The Chinese, Vietnamese and Algerians have attained
spectacular anti-colonial successes through such form of
struggle. Guerrilla armed struggle has also helped the Cubans
to free themselves from American neo-colonialism.
Marxism accepts both the peaceful and non¬
peaceful ways of development of a revolu¬
tion. It does not absolutize either, but
emphasizes the need to master all forms of
revolutionary struggle. However, regard-
^A. Iskenderov and L. Stepanov, "Modern Colonialism,"
in The Third World, op. cit.. p. 61.
2
Pomeroy, o£^. cit. , p. 30.
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less of the forms and methods of struggle,
the most Important factors are the strength
of a united people, a correct political
line, flexibility in the choice of forms of
struggle and this is essential - the existence
of a vanguard political party as the leading
force in the revolution. A nation will enter
into armed struggle and carry it to comple¬
tion only when it realizes that such struggle
is inevitable and necessary.^
An equally obvious generalization needs to be made
about the "non-peaceful way" of liquidating colonialism. The
forcible breakdown of the colonial system in recent years
under the impact of national liberation movements has been
partly due to the material aid which comes from the socialist
camp that regards all national liberation movements as con¬
stituting an Integral part of the world revolutionary process.
Prior to the Russian October Revolution, the nations of Asia
and Africa were, in spite of their numerical superiority,
unable to militarily resist the colonialists who had the
advantage of superior weapons, organization and tactics.^
Thanks to the victory of the Russian October Revolution, and
the definitive implantation of socialism on one-sixth of the
world's surface, the Soviet peoples consistently supported
and materially helped the Chinese people in the latter's
national liberation war against the Japanese Invaders between
1932 and 1945.^ There are other instances which show how
^V. I. Palvov, e^. al^. , £2.. cit. , pp. 320-21.
^Ibid. , p. 317.
^L. Velyusln, "Socialism and the National-Liberation
Struggle," in The Third World, op. cit. , p. 264.
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direct military cooperation with a socialist state can help
national liberation movements achieve victories in their
anti-colonialist armed struggle. For example:
...the Soviet Union enabled the Korean
peoples Democratic Republic to strengthen
its army, which, together with Chinese
volunteers, beat off a huge modern army
of the imperialists headed by the United
States. An example of effective combina¬
tion of armed forces was the struggle and
guerrilla actions waged by the army of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the
French invaders and their local henchmen.
In 1949, between the DRV and socialist
countries direct contact was established,
which laid the groundwork for the decisive
victory of the Vietnamese people. The
experience of the Vietnamese people was
utilized by the leadership of Algeria, whose
determined struggle compelled France to
retreat and recognize the Independence of
Algeria. The remaining colonies mostly in
Africa and occupied territories in Asia...
are now building up armed forces that would
be capable of striking powerful blows at
the imperialist war machine; and in this
they enjoy the solidarity of the socialist
and newly free countries.®
Speaking of the role of the newly Independent African
countries and the socialist world in the Guinean and Cape
Verdian national liberation struggle against the Portuguese
colonialists, Cabral had this to say:
We want to add that within the framework of
Africa there are some countries that aid us
bilaterally. For example, we receive the
greatest support from the Republic of Guinea,
the greatest facilities for the development
of our struggle. Algeria continues to help,
the U. A. R. also....Other African countries
have aided us. For example, Tanzania, which
aids the people of Mozambique, and the
6V. I. Palvov, ej^. a^. , ojg^. cit. , pp. 319-320.
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Congo (Brazaville), which aids the people
of Angola, also aids us.
We want to mention the special aid given to
us by the peoples of the socialist countries.
We believe that this aid is a historic obli¬
gation, because we consider that our struggle
also constitutes a defense of the socialist
countries. And we want to say particularly
that the Soviet Union, first of all, and
China, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and other
socialist countries continue to aid us, which
we consider very useful for the development
of our armed struggle. We also want to lay
special emphasis on the untiring efforts -
sacrifices that we deeply appreciate - that the
people of Cuba...are making to make effective
aid to our struggle.^
We may also add that, while admittedly the paucity of
empirical data on the assistance which the Guinean and Cape
Verdian national liberation movement receives does not permit
a full scale documentation, one can still show the nature of
the assistance Involved. It is, for example, known that
individually, or through the 0. A. U.'s African Liberation
Committee, most African states have continued to give diplo-
Q
matlc recognition and financial assistance. Scandinavian
countries have generally been helpful in supplying books
9
which are adapted to the conditions in Guinea. In addition,
Sweden has since 1969 given about $3,450,000 to the Guinean
^Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op. cit., pp. 148-49.
®Cf. Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolution of 'Portuguese'
Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8,1, (1970),
34. It is now understood that the 0. A. U.'s Liberation
Committee has asked from its member states for about
$3,300,000, some of which will go to the Guinean and Cape
Verdian national liberation movement. Cf. African Research
Bulletin, 10, 2 (February 1-28, 1973), 2747.
^Africa Report (November-December 1972), 22.
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and Cape Verdian national liberation movement. There are
also non-governmental western institutions which give financial
assistance. The World Council of Churches (WCC) had, in 1970,
allocated about $200,000 to liberation movements in Africa,
some of which was given to the Guinean and Cape Verdian
national liberation movement.WCC has, for its 1973
programs, indicated that its main emphasis will be in Southern
Africa
with slightly more than half of the total
(grants) going to medical, educational and
social service activities of liberation
movements in...and Guinea-Bissau.
The Interrellglous for Community Organization has given $27,180
to the Guinean and Cape Verdian national liberation movement
which will be used to develop educational programs for inde¬
pendence, along with medical, agricultural and economic
13
programs. But by far, the largest portion of aid to the
Guinean and Cape Verdian national liberation movement comes
from socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. The
aid which comes from socialist countries has usually consisted
14
of arms, money and training. Cuban advisors are known to
have played an advisory role in the Guinean and Cape Verdian
^^Africa Research Bulletin. 10,2(February 12-28, 1973),
2747.
ii
Jon Woronoff, "The Activist," Africa Report (February
1972), 20.
^^Southern Africa, 6,4(Aprll 1973), 27.
^^IFCO News. 4,3(May-June 1973), 2.
14
Whitaker, £2,. cit. , p. 34. See also Richard Gibson,
African Liberation Movements (New York and London, 1972), p. 256.
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nationalist movement.Although the degree of Chinese
support for the Guinean and Cape Verdian national liberation
movement Is unclear, the Chinese press reports have often
mentioned the movement, and delegations from the latter have
visited China.
Perhaps of no less Impact on the development of recent
national liberation movements Is the revolutionary experience
of countries which applied Marxist-oriented guerrilla
strategies to their specific objective conditions. While the
student of a national liberation movement may be reminded that
It would be no exaggeration to say that
there Is not a single truly national
and truly emancipatory movement which
has not been Influenced by the Ideology,
theory and practice of Marxism and
Leninism
he must at the same time pay attention to the fact that In
the economically backward countries of Asia and Africa, the
peasantry Is the base of an antl-colonlallst front. Although
set and determined by China's own economic conditions, the
Chinese peasant-based antl-colonlal strategy has been the
most Influential of all antl-colonlal liberation struggles
In recent years. Among the principal strategic principles
developed by Mao Tse-tung are the strong emphasis placed on
the education of the peasantry, the need of establishing
^^Cf. Whitaker, o£^. clt. , p. 34.
^^Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy
(Berkely, Los Angeles and London, 1971), p. 143.
^^V. I. Palvov, e^ a^., ££. clt., 95.
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liberated base areas in the countryside, the necessity of
changing a guerrilla war into a mobile war and the necessity
18
of surrounding and capturing the cities from the countryside.
The success of the struggle against the French colonial
power in Vietnam was due to the phase-by-phase application
of Mao's strategic principles.Cabral, who later developed
a strategy much like that of Mao and who had drawn extensively
from the experience of other armed struggles notes:
At present, to carry out the armed national
liberation struggle it is not necessary to
invent much along general lines. Already a
wealth of experience has been gained in the
armed national liberation struggle through¬
out the world. The Chinese people fought.
The Vietnamese people have been fighting for
more than 25 years. The Cuban people fought
heroically and defeated the reactionaries
and the imperialists on their Island, which
is today a stronghold of progress. Other
peoples have struggled and have made known
to the world their experience in the struggle.'^
While the external situation, particularly since the
second world war, has assumed Importance, it should not, of
course, be thought that the external situation inevitably
creates the conditions for the forcible liquidation of
colonialism. It does not. The external situation merely
creates favourable conditions and additional opportunities
X 8
Cf. Pomeroy, 0£. cit. , p. 27. For an understanding
of the principles involved in the strategy of guerilla war,
see Selected Military Writings of Mao-tse Tung (Peking,
1968).
^^Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (New York, 1965),
pp. 62-63.
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Cabral, Revolution In Guinea, op * cite, p. 138.
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for intensifying the national liberation movement whose
strategy must be based on a concrete understanding of the
relations of forces between the main colonizer and the
nationalists. What is here emphasized is that
To the Marxist formulations regarding internal
factors of revolutionary situations and of
insurrection could now be added a strong
external factor.
Of course, this has not altered the basic
Marxist precept that revolutions cannot be
exported but must arise and develope from
absolutely necessary conditions within a
country.21
Cabral complements the foregoing point by stating that
But nobody commits the error, in general, of
blindly applying the experience of others, to
his own country^ To determine the [strategy]
for the struggle in our country, we had to
take into account the geographical, historical,
economic, and social conditions of our own
country, both in Guinea and in Cabo Verde.22
A wide range of economic, social and political condi¬
tions coalesced to set the stage for the strategy through
which Guinean and Cape Verdian nationalism operates. The
major economic difficulties revolved around the Portuguese
tax and indirect method of exploitation. Taxation was based
more on the Portuguese fiscal needs than on the colonial
population's ability to contribute. Portuguese enterprises
had monopoly in the economy of Guinea which was largely based
on traditional agriculture and animal husbandry.
21pomeroy, ££. cit., p. 29.
^^Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, op. cit. . p. 138.
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Portuguese colonialism was blatantly Inefficient and
unresponsive. The Portuguese economic reforms never
materialized. The failure of their economic plans resulted
In mass unemployment, emigrations, and In the victimization
of thousands of people to the horrors of famine. Nor had
the Portuguese shown any appreciable degree of Interest In
the education and sanitation of their colonial subjects.
Only a fraction of the Cape Verdlans could have claim to
education. The situation was no better for the educated
Cape Verdlans who were confronted with the annoying discre¬
pancy between their education and ability and the latitude
provided for their socio-economic advance and corresponding
political power. Inasmuch as other colonial conditions had
given birth to great political thinkers and strategists, the
Portuguese colonial conditions gave birth to a remarkable
political thinker and strategist, the late Amllcar Cabral.
As a Cape Verldan, Cabral had early access to educa¬
tion and graduated from the Gll Earnes High School In Sao
Vincente.He then won the scholarship of a Lisbon Univer¬
sity, from where he graduated with an engineering degree In
agronomy.But more Importantly, when Cabral was a student
at Lisbon, he was for the first time Introduced to Marxism-
Leninism by his fellow students from Angola and Mozambique.
23see Chllcote, "The Political Thought of Amllcar
Cabral," The Journal of Modern African Studies, op.clt.,p.375.
24 Ibid.
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Steve Goldfield, "Amllcar Cabral and the Liberation
Struggle In Portuguese Guinea," Socialist Revolution, 3, 142
(January-Aprll 1973), p. 128.
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In 1948, Cabral Agostlnho Neto (an Angolan) and Mario de
Andrade (a Mozambiquian) established a Centre for African
Studies.The Centre for African Studies allowed them to
study the nature of Portuguese colonialism and to "re-
Africanize" themselves by learning the languages of the
peoples they had come from.^^ They came to the inevitable
conclusion that no progress could be achieved within the
colonial structure of Portugal, and that a far-reaching
process of democratization, which envisaged violent national
2 ftliberation movements, was necessary at some point in time. °
Having qualified himself as an agronomist In 1950,
Cabral returned to Guinea where he was employed to prepare
an agricultural census for the colonial administration.^^
Cabral's job involved two years (1952-4) of travel across
Guinea, which exposed him to peasant life and knowledge,
factors which proved to be Important in the struggle that
was to come later.
Cabral had a great Interest in revolutionary theory
and ideology which he formulated and concretized in the
context of his particular experience and his knowledge of
2 ft
^^Davidson, The Liberation of Gulne, op. clt., p. 29.





Marxism-Leninism. In an address delivered to the first Tri-
continental Conference in Havana, in January 1966, Cabral
underscored the Importance of a revolutionary theory in the
following terms;
This opinion is the result of our own
experiences of the struggle and of a
critical appreciation of the experiences
of others. To those who see in it a
theoretical character, we would recall
that every practice produces a theory,
and that if it is true that a revolution
can fail even though it be based on
perfectly conceived theories, nobody has
yet made a successful revolution without
a revolutionary theory.
Cabral believed that a national.liberation movement
is impossible without an Ideology that principally moves
from the realities of one's own given condition. In a
question and answer session held in the University of London,
on October 27, 1971, Cabral declared:
Our desire to develop our country with social
justice and powers in the hands of the people
is our Ideological basis. Never again do we
want to see a group or a class of people
exploiting or dominating the work of our
people. That's our basis. If you want to
call it Marxism, you may call it Marxism....^^
Being himself a revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie, Cabral
sought an historical justification for a revolutionary petty
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from the quotation below.
The colonial situation, which does not permit
the development of a native pseudo-bourgeoisie
and in which the popular masses do not generally
reach the necessary level of political conscious¬
ness before the advent of the phenomenon of
national liberation, offers the petty bourgeoisie
the historical opportunity of leading the struggle
against foreign domination, since by [the] nature
of its objective and subjective position (higher
standard of living than that of the masses, more
frequent contact with the agents of colonialism,
and hence more chances of being humiliated,
higher level of education and political awareness,
etc.) it is the stratum which most rapidly
beomces aware of the need to free Itself from
foreign domination. This historical responsibility
is assumed by the sector of the petty bourgeoisie
which, in the colonial context, can be called
revolutionary. while other sectors retain the
doubts characteristic of these classes or ally
themselves to colonialism so as to defend,
albeit Illusory, their social situation.
[Italics in the original.]
The exemplary Cabral introduced "the notion of
suicide" for the petty bourgeoisie so that it can meet its
historical responsibility in the national liberation move¬
ment. Cabral decreed that
in order to truly fulfill the role in the
national liberation struggle, the revolutionary
petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing
suicide as a class in order to be reborn as
revolutionary workers, completely identified
with the deepest aspiration of the people to
which they belong.3^
Cabral also recognized that nothing could be achieved
by a small group of petty bourgeoisie, however dedicated.
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^^Ibid. . p. 110.
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In a brilliant statement given in May 1964
at the Frantz Fanon Centre in Italy, [Cabral]
outlined the basic analysis on which he and
his fellow fighters had based their organi¬
zational tactics, recognizing that ’the
peasants would the mainstay in our
struggle* but that it would be necessary to
'struggle fiercely for peasant supportand
Indeed in the years between 1959 and 1963,
when PAIGC was ready to embark on an armed
struggle, Cabral made a fundamental contribu¬
tion to the future of his country by carefully
building a widening base of political educa¬
tion, creating consciousness amongst the
peasantry, so that they could become the engine
of the revolt.35
In September 1956, Cabral and five other Cape Verdian
petty bourgeoisie prepared the way for their own "suicide"
by clandestinely establishing the PAIGC (Partido Africano da
Guine e Cabo Verde), the nationalist party which has now
turned the Portuguese into alienated, desperate enemies.
The six founders recall that it was on
September 19, 1956, when on the basis of
the errors committed and the obstacles
encountered in the course of militant
action, they determined how to go about
preparing to set in motion the war of
national liberation:
On the basis of a sociological analysis
of the country and the relations of forces
between the main enemy and the nationalists,
the Party determined how to make a dormant
people aware of their oppression....
(Emphasis our)
But, finding that the Guinean peasantry was, Insplte
of its numerical superiority, a mere potentially revolutionary
^^George Houser, "In Memory of Cabral: Two Statements,
Africa Today, 20,l(Winter, 1973), 3-4.
^^Mario de Andrade, "October in Guinea," Revolution
Africaine (December 7, 1967), quoted in Pomeroy, op.cit.,p.41.
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"Physical force," it appears that the Party had placed more
emphasis upon the urban nascent proletariat during the
initial phase of the struggle. This might, indeed, explain
why PAIGC focused its primary attention to the mobilization
of urban workers, particularly those working in river trans¬
portation.
However, in the meantime, in 1957, the notorious
Portuguese Political Police (PIDE)^^ was introduced in Guinea
to suppress PAIGC activities.And when in the latter part
of July 1959 PAIGC led a Bissau dockworkers’ strike for higher
wages, the Portuguese PIDE broke the strike on August 3, 1959,
39
with the massacre of fifty strikers at the Pljiguiti quai.
The "Pijiguiti massacres," as it was later to be
called, did not only arouse indignation among the population
of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, but it also necessitated
a fundamental shift in PAIGC activities. As Cabral was later
to admit, the "Pijiguiti massacre" showed that PAIGC was
following "a mistaken line and that it had no experience.^®
The mistake and lack of experience are probably apparent from
37
PIDE stands for Pollcia International e de Defensa
do Estado and is modeled on the German Gestapo. See Chllcote,
Portuguese Africa, op. cit.. p. 31.
O Q
Hidipo Hamutenya, "The Forward March of the African
Revolution; Guinea (Bissau), The Exemplary PAIGC," Third
World Solidarity, 3,1 (March, 1972), 6.
^^Chaliand, o£_. cit.. p. 21.
^®Amilcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," Portuguese
Colonies; Victory or Death, op. cit.. p. 144.
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the fact that PAIGC attempted to gain national independence
by launching a strike in the capital city where the Portuguese
were effectively entrenched, although, given the economic
and social conditions of Guinea, only a rural peasant-based
struggle could defeat the Portuguese who were almost entirely
confined to the towns. Cabral's analysis of the mistake and
inexperience does not only reinforce the preceding explana¬
tion, but it is also suggestive of the Maoist line which he
was later to adopt. Observe the quotation below.
At that moment the Party knew nothing of
what was happening in the world and we
had to advance empirically. It wasn't
until 1961 that I got to know the works
of Mao Tse-tung. The lack of experience
made us think that we could fight in the
cities with strikes and other things, but
we were wrong and the reality of the
moment showed us that it was not possible.
At any rate, convinced that they had made a mistake
by concentrating on the urban population, where the Portuguese
had proven strongest, the leaders of PAIGC met clandestinely
in Bissau in September 19, 1959 and revised their strategy.
The meeting at which Cabral presided, adopted the following
six-point strategy.
1. Without delay mobilize and organize
the peasant masses who will be, as
experience shows, the main force in
the struggle for national liberation.
2. Strengthen [the PAIGC] organization




3. Develop and reinforce unity around the
party of the Africans of all ethnic
groups, origins and social strata.
4. Prepare as many cadres as possible,
either Inside the country or abroad,
for political leadership and the
successful development of [the
struggle],
5. Mobilize emigrer in neighboring
territories so as to draw them into
the liberation struggle and the future
of our people.
6. Work to acquire the means that will be
needed for success.
The following four years were largely spent in implementing
the foregoing six-point strategy which in effect shifted the
active struggle to the ethnically diverse rural peasant popu¬
lation .
While Issuing futile appeals to the Portuguese regime
to allow Guineans and Cape Verdians to have peaceful democra¬
tic self-rule, PAI6C was, by 1960, sending a small stream of
young men and women to the Republic of Guinea which had won
its Independence of France in 1958. The latter act was
possible because President Ahmed Sekou Toure of the Republic
of Guinea had given his country's full support to PAIGC.^^
In the shelter of the Republic of Guinea PAIGC established a
Political School which was taught by Cabral and attended by
Guinean urban workers and mobile young folks. The whole
purpose of the school was to train cadres (political activists)
/ O
^Davidson, Liberation of Guine, op. cit. , p. 32.
^^Ibid.. pp. 33, 93.
44Gibson, 0£^. cit., p. 255
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who would subsequently mobilize the Guinean peasantry for
the national liberation movement that would later enter the
phase of armed struggle. As Cabral had acquired detailed
local knowledge during his colonial service, it was easy for
him to devise a formula which took into account the concrete
reality of the peasants’ lives. As the peasants were
uneducated, a mobilization formula that would call for struggle
against colonialism or imperialism would not have appealed
to them. As also the Guinean peasantry was owner of the land
which it cultivated, a mobilization formula that would tell
the peasants that "the land belongs to those who work on it"
would not be enough to mobilize them.^^ A mobilization
formula that would capitalize on the ethnic differences was
even much worse as this would divide the peasantry, and was
not in any event wisely contemplated by any provision of the
preceding six-point strategy. Cabral instead came up with
a mobilization formula which was devoid of generalization
(like fight colonialism, imperialism, etc.) and had no
tribalistlc appeal. Some of the mobilization formula, which
was studied by the cadres who had to repeat it many times to
ensure their grasp of it appears in a series of direct and
leading questions, a portion of which is quoted below.
Why are we going to fight?
What are you? What is your father?
What has happened to your father
until now? What is happening? What
is the situation? Did you pay the
tax? Did your father pay the tax?
^^Amilcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," Portuguese
Colonies; Victory or Death, op. cit. , p. 145.
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What have you seen from that tax? How
much do you get from your peanuts?
Have you thought about what you will
earn with your peanuts? How much sweat
has it cost your family? Which of you
were prisoners? Was it you who was a
prisoner?
These were the mobilizing factors.
You are going to work in road-building.
Who gives you the tools? You bring the
tools. Who provides the meal? You pro¬
vide the meal. But - who walks in the
street? Who has a car? And your
daughter who was raped by that so-and-
so -- do you find that all right?^^
While the politicization of the peasant masses was
underway, Cabral established links with nationalist movements
in Angola and Mozambique and joined the Frente Revoluclona
Afrlcana para a Independecla Naclonal das Colonals Portugueses
(FRAIN) , founded in Tunis in 1960 and superseded one year
later by the Conferencla da Organlzacoes Natlonalistas das
Colonlas Portugueses (CONCP) in Casablanca.Cabral also
tried to create a coalition with another less respectable
Guinean nationalist movement, the Frente de Lutta pela
Independencla Naclonal da Guine (FLING), which was hostile
to PAIGC's composition and goals.
^^Ibid.
^^Chilcote, "The Political Thought of Amllcar Cabral,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies, op. cit., p. 376.
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FLING was a native Guinean party which was formed
in Dakar, Senegal, in 1963, out of a number of small groups.
Its objective was solely limited to the liberation of Guinea
as opposed to the Cape Verde Islands. FLING was known to
resent Cape Verdians' mixed blood and their historical
cooperation with the Portuguese. FLING had consequently
45a
been hostile to PAIGC in whose hierarchy Cape Verdians pre¬
dominated. See Biggs-Davison, 0£^. cit. , p. 390. See also
Gibson, o£. cit., 261-62.
Although at the beginning FLING represented several
ethnic groups, its tribal divisions kept it a loose organiza¬
tion. See Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. cit. , p. 101.
As there is no evidence to suggest FLING*s militant
action in Guinea, it is difficult to say that it had any
worthwhile credentials. PAIGC viewed it as a "Portuguese
puppet." Supporting PAIGC's view is the fact that in 1963
Pinto Bull, fling's president, flew to Lisbon, Portugal, to
discuss potential reforms with Salazar and succeeded in
having his brother Jaime appointed as Secretary General of
Guinea and representative of the "Province" in Portugal's
National Assembly.
FLING is known to have devoted its efforts to the
refugee community of some 65,000 Guineans in Senegal which
PAIGC has now left to the care of international relief
organizations. See Paul M. Whitaker, 02.. cit., p. 26. What
is more, there are now sources which tend to indicate that
FLING has ceased to exist functioning as an organization.
See Gibson, o£. cit., p. 263.
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Meanwhile, as the preparatory political mobilization
was taking firm root In the Guinean rural population, PAIGC
began to Implant guerrilla bases. The bases In the South
were In the zones of Cobucare, Indljassan, Gambara, Qulntafane
and Susua; and In the north there were established two or
49
three bases. The guerrillas were armed with war machines,
which were [presumably procurred from socialist countries]
and which were brought to Guinea with great difficulty.^®
But before PAIGC launched guerrilla offensives, It tested
the loyalty and strength of Its followers by asking the latter
to fell trees In the roads and to disrupt communication lines,
an operation which was successfully undertaken between 1961
and mld-1962.51
Quite satisfied with the results achieved, PAIGC met
In Conakry (Republic of Guinea) between August and September
1962 and decided to enter the phase of armed struggle.
The site of the first guerrilla operations was to be the
south. The choice was apparently made because of the dense
forests and waterways In the south where movement would be
difficult for the Portuguese but relatively easy for the
guerrillas whose support was based on an already mobilized
local population. In pursuance of the decision, the southern
^^Amllcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," Portuguese
Colonies! Victory or Death, op. clt. , p. 150.
^®Ibld.
^^Ibld.; Cf. Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op.clt. ,p.l02.
S 2
Challand, op,, clt. , p. 22.
^^Chllcote, Portuguese Africa, op. clt. , p. 102.
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half of Guinea was brought under a broad guerrilla operation
by January 1963. The result was successful. The guerrillas
destroyed CUF warehouses, thereby lowering export production,
54
and they brought one-third of Guinea under PAIGC control.
The military strategy which PAIGC adopted evidences
the dilemma that could not be resolved by the Portuguese.
According to Cabral, when PAIGC .launched the armed struggle,
the Portuguese were compelled to reinforce
their presence—they brought in troops and
distributed them all over the country, in
the villages as well as the urban centres,
to maintain their domination.
But this disper^iien of the enemy forces
meant weakness, and our strategy was to
concentrate specific forces to attack the
Portuguese place by place. They suffered
losses immediately, and made the fatal move
of concentrating their forces in order to
defend themselves. But this meant leaving
large parts of the country outside their
control. This was, and is, a dilemma that
cannot be solved in a colonial war: when
they disperse their forces so as to maintain
control, we concentrate ours so as to attack
them, thus forcing them to concentrate. But
when their forces are concentrated, we
organize, mobilize, and develop new struc¬
tures in the countryside, so that they can
never come back.55
In response to the size of the liberated zones which
required a more centralized military and administrative
operations, PAIGC held a congress in the Southern region and
resolved to, interalia, organize a regular army and local
5^Challand, £2.. cit. , p. 110.
Cabral, Our People Are Our Mountains, op. cit.,
p. 13
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militias, and to create village committees which would
administratively replace the Portuguese and develop people's
stores.
The implementation of the preceding plans continued
through 1964, 1965 and 1966.^^ The extension of the liberated
zones was also markedly rising. Thus in 1965, the liberated
zones extended over half of Guinea.^® The rainy season of
1966 witnessed a stepped up struggle and a further systematic
destruction of Portuguese garrisons and fortified zones.
By 1967, all the guerrilla forces were turned into regular
6 0
forces. Since 1967, the armed forces of PAIGC have taken
two forms: the regular army known as the Forces Armees
Revolutlonnalres du Peuple (FARP) and the people's armed
militias with bases in the liberated zones.The mobility
of FARP did greatly extend the range of military operations.
In 1968, FARP's mobile mortar unit brought under attack the
6 2
heavily defended airport of Bissau. FARP was also
^^Ibid.. p. 23.
^^Davidson, The Liberation of Guine, op. cit., p. 103.
^^Ibid. See also Challand, 0£^. cit. , p. 24.
^^ibid.
^^Cabral, "The Power of Arms," Portuguese Colonies;
Victory or Death, op. cit., p. 153.
^^Ibid. The English version for FARP is "The Peoples'
Revolutionary Armed Forces."
^^Davidson, The Liberation of Guine, op. cit. , p. 109.
responsible for increasing the size of PAIGC controlled
territory which, by the spring of 1969, covered over two-
thirds of Guinea.
With over two-thirds of Guinea under its control,
PAIGC has since 1969 concentrated its military operations
in the urban centres. Between January and August 1971
508 major actions. Including 369 attacks
on garrisons in urban centres, 102 ambushes
and other operations on roads, 15 major
mining activities ,A14 actions against river
transport and 8 commando operations in town
centres
were successfully undertaken. Bruno Crimi reports that
The airport of Bissau, though well defended,
was struck several times in the course of
the last months. The Portuguese up to that
time considered a zone of 60 kilometers to the
east of Bissau to be Impregnable. Today, in
that area also nothing goes well for them
any more.®^
Crimi adds that he
had an enlightening conversation with a
commander who, at the end of May [1972]
directed the most deadly operation against
the capital (Bissau), during the course of
which three barracks and the airport was
hit. "The attack" he said, "was launched
6 3
Amilcar Cabral, The Struggle in Guinea (Africa
Research Group, Reprint 1), introduction.
^^Amilcar Cabral, "A Brief Report on the Situation of
the Struggle" (January-August 1971), Ufhamy, 2, 3 (Winter,
1972), 23. This is substantiated by other sources. See for
example, "PAIGC success," Southern Africa, 4, 10 (December,
1971), 9; PAIGC Actualities, 27-March, 28-April, 29-May
(1971); "Portuguese Die in PAIGC Victories," Angola in Arms,
2,1 (February, 1971), 3; "PAIGC Destroys T-6 Plane," Southern
Africa, 4,4 (March, 1971), 11; "Two Visits to Guinea (Bissau),
Southern Africa. 4,5 (May, 1971), 5.
^^Bruno Crimi, "Portuguese Guinea is Due for Indepen¬
dence," Encore (March 1973), p. 19.
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during the day starting from a position
17 kilometers from Bissau."^6
In an implied appreciation of the source of the destructive
weapons and in explicit appreciation of the high level of
military training of PAIGC fighters, Crimi asks and remarks:
'With what type of weapons? Long-range
cannons and 122 millimeter rockets.' Any
military expert will tell you that, in
order to launch 122 millimeter rockets,
one has to have a personnel of a high
technical level.67
Faced by the spectacular military success of PAIGC, the Portu¬
guese are now believed to be militarily desperate, and are
concealed in towns from which they conduct occasional air
raids by using napalm, phosphorous and other defoliage sub¬
stances, all of which are used by the IT. S. in its imperialist
war in Vietnam.
The activity of PAIGC in the Cape Verde Islands has
also been considerably intensified in recent years. In his
September 1971 report, Cabral indicated the progress the PAIGC
has made in the last few years, which was reflected in the
strengthening of its clandestine organization and in the
growing nationalist feelings of the population. By way of
Illustration, he cited
Fourteen Africans [who] were arrested... and
charged with belonging to PAIGC and attempt¬






Cabral, Our People Are Our Mountains, op. cit.,
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Cabral also highlighted PAIGC's
decisions relating to the strengthening of
the armed struggle, the development of the
struggle In the Cape Verde Islands, and, on
the humanitarian level, the creation of the
Red Cross of Gulne and Cape Verde.
In addition to the programmes we already
broadcast on the 'Voice of the Revolution'
(Republic of Guinea, four times a week) we
have recently been granted the use of the
network of Radio Senegal (three times a week)
and Radio Nauretalnla (once a week). This
has enabled us to expand enormously the
Information to
Further, In a report given In October 1972, In New York,
Cabral Indicated the growing position of PAIGC In the Cape
Verde Islands. In that report Cabral stated that
[PAIGC's] relations with the Cape Verde Islands
now are better than ever. We have been waiting
for new developments, and yesterday, we received
a message from our comrades that there have been
riots between the Portuguese authorities and the
people In Praia. It's the capital of the Cape
Verde Islands, on Santiago Island. They arrested
many people. But the message In the end Is,
that you can be sure we are still strong In our
position (In the Cape Verde Islands) and are
ready for all kinds of problems with the Portu¬
guese colonialists.
The Cape Verde soldiers In the Portuguese forces have also
several times, manifested their opposition to
the war. There was even a revolt In a barrack
In Lisbon; two officers were killed by Cape
Verde soldiers,....
On their part, the Portuguese multiply their
arrests since they discovered caches of weapons
and PAIGC literature Instigating their soldiers
to mutiny.
In light of this fact, we can suppose that
well trained personnel has already been Infil¬
trated Into the Cape Verde Islands and that a
69ibld.. p. 36.
70Amllcar Cabral, "A Report To Our Friends," Africa
Today, 20, 1 (Winter, 1973), 8.
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popular rising will take place soon.^^
The enormous military successes of PAIGC since 1963,
which are attested to, among other things, by the size of
the liberated zones and the military desperateness of the
Portuguese, are totally impressive on their own. A full
appraisal of PAIGC’s strategical activities must, however,
include the changes which it has brought about in the
economic, social and political areas, which have in turn
enhanced the development and success of the military.
In conformity with the 1964 PAIGC’s congressional
decision, Cabral had stressed the need for the peasants not
only to aid the liberation forces, but also to supply their
own basic economic needs. These needs have been met by the
opening up of peoples' stores, whose importance have been
summed up by Cabral himself:
Keep always in mind that the people are
not fighting for ideas, for the things in
one's head. They are fightlng...for
material benefits, to live better and in
peace, to see their lives go forward, to
guarantee the future of their children....
It is pointless to liberate a region if the
population remains without essential
goods.
In addition to providing the essential goods for themselves
and for the liberation forces, the peasants have brought
extensive acreages of land under rice cultivation. As a
result, thousands of tons of rice are being exported from
^^Crlmi, £2.. cit. , p. 20.
^^Quoted in Race Today, 3, 11 (November, 1971), 378.
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the liberated zones via the Republic of
Though small In volume, other products






On the social plane, FAIGC has established many
hospitals and dispensaries. There are now over two dozen
hospitals and 120 dispensaries which adequately supply medical
facilities In the liberated zones.PAIGC has also set up
schools In many villages and runs Its own teacher-training
centre where It uses textbooks adapted to the specific condi¬
tions and problems of Guinea.^® PAIGC has at present 150
elementary schools which are attended by some 15j000 children
with more than 220 school teachers.
Politically, PAIGC has built one community out of
diverse ethnic groups. A common revolutionary struggle
against Portuguese colonialism has brought the various Guinean
peasants to share a patriotic political consciousness of unity
and common destiny. Women have Joined the ranks of men In
all the national liberation activities of PAIGC. Disputes
7 8
are solved by popularly elected courts In the villages.
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Hamutenya, o£^. clt. , p. 8.
^^Race Today, 3, 11 (November, 1971), 378.
^^Ibld.
^^Portugal’s Wars In Africa (May, 1971), p. 15.
^^Race Today. 3, 11 (November, 1971), 378.
^®Lars Rudebec, "Political Mobilization For Develop¬
ment In Guinea-Bissau," The Journal of Modern African
Studies. 10, 1 (1972), 12-15.
54
A new socialist scientific thinking is already replacing past
79
beliefs in religion* witchcraft and mythical guidance.
Cabral, of course, made it quite clear that PA16C
planned to follow the socialist road as
the only way of eliminating all forms
of human exploitation.
Since PAIGC is now in control of over two-thirds of
Guinea and has already an extensive military, economic, social
and political structures, certain of the features of sovereignty
are already present in the liberated parts of Guinea. In
August, 1971, PAIGC adopted the institution of a Popular
81National Assembly. And in the summer of 1972, elections
were held for the National Assembly. Out of the 120 represen¬
tatives to the First National Assembly,
80 were elected by the masses of the people
and 40 chosen from among the members of the
Party.
The institution of a National Assembly will, in the words of
Cabral,
reinforce the sovereignty of the people and
enlarge the democratic basis of actions now
and in the future.
7 9
Hamutenya, £2^. cit. , p. 8.
®®Goldfield, ££. cit., p. 128.
®^Amilcar Cabral, "A Brief Report on The Situation of
the Struggle" (January-August, 1971), Ufhamy, op. cit., p. 19.
^^Africa Report (November-December 1972), p. 22. 80 of
the 120 members were chosen by 77,515 adults. See John Marcum,
02_. cit,. , p. 21.
8 3
Cabral, Our People Are Our Mountains, op.cit., 17.
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The institution of a National Assembly is also in keeping
with PAIGC's principles, which progressively give authority
to the people. In this connection Cabral noted:
We think we have to be quiet with our
(Party's) principles. We want our people
to take, step by step, in their own hands
the authority for their own lives. For
that, the party is not enough. It is too
dangerous, the fact that in our historical
condition we have to have only one party.
It is necessary to have some organ, some
Instrument in order to give to the people
this real consciousness that they are the
master of their own destiny. [Original in
bold letters.]
The strengthening of the sovereignty of the people in the
liberated areas will additionally help to intensify the
struggle in the Guinean urban centres, and also in the Cape
Verde Islands, where PAIGC is believed to have already
infiltrated and launched political mobilization.
Considering the fact that the relations of forces
have been altered in favor of PAIGC and that Guineans and
Cape Verdians are already experiencing a measure of self-rule
in the liberated areas, it appears that the defeat of Portugal
is not too far away. Even the attempt, presumably by Portu¬
guese agents, to create a crisis at the top level of PAIGC
leadership by assassinating Amilcar Cabral on January 20,
1973 does not seem to alter the fate of Portugal.
Whatever the setback arising from the assassination
of Cabral to PAIGC, which has yet to be studied, the Guinean
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Cabral, "A Report to Our Friends," Africa Report,
20,1 (Winter, 1973), 9.
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and Cape Verdian national liberation movement Is far greater
than one man and will continue until final victory. Such a
victory Is assured by the mass-based strategy and the
favorable external situation which has already altered the
relations of forces In favor of PAIGC, now headed by Aristide
Pereira.®^
Q C
Africa Research Bulletin^ 10, 2(March 15, 1972),
See also Southern Africa, 6,4 (April, 1973), 22.2767
CONCLUSION
The Portuguese made their first contacts with Africa
in 1444-5, when they reached the Cape Verde Islands and there¬
after established bases for slave trading leading toward the
interior of West Africa. Lacking Portuguese women, the
Portuguese mated with African women from Guinea-Bissau, and
it is this miscegenation which the Portuguese cite as being
supportive of their dubious claim of racial harmony and
cultural integration of Portuguese with Africans.
As a result of the scramble for colonies by all the
capitalist states of Western Europe at the turn of the
nineteenth century, and with the support of the British
which checked the French advance, the Portuguese set out to
conquer Guinea-Bissau. But it was not until 1936, about half
a century after the Portuguese launched their conquest
against the Guinean tribes, that they could actually liquidate
the local resistance.
Quite naturally, the breakdown of local resistance
set the stage for the exploitation and suppression of Guineans
and Cape Verdlans. Historically, Portugal found active
support in its colonial administration from Cape Verdian
mulattos and the Guinean Black chiefs to the degree that the
economic and social colonial structure was not relatively




But Portuguese colonialism proved to be blatantly
Inefficient and unresponsive. The Portuguese economic reforms
never materialized. The failure of their economic plans
resulted In mass unemployment, emigrations, and In the victimi¬
zation of thousands of people to the horrors of famine. Nor
had the Portuguese any significant Interest In the education
and sanitation of their colonial subjects. Only a fraction
of the Cape Verdian mulattos, who were considered racially
superior to the African Guineans, could have claim to educa¬
tion. The situation was no better for the educated Cape
Verdians who were confronted with the annoying discrepancy
between their education and ability and the latitude for
their socio-economic advance and political power.
The Portuguese colonial condition gave birth to a
remarkable political thinker and strategist with a Marxist
persuasion, the late Amilcar Cabral. Cabral well understood
that Portuguese colonialism diverted his fellow Guineans and
Cape Verdians from the right of following their natural
historical path, and thereby Impeded their development. He
therefore defined the objective of national liberation as
being one of freeing "the process of development of the
national productive forces."
In September 1956, Cabral and five other educated Cape
Verdians established the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Indepen-
dencla da Gulne e Cabo Verde), the party which became the
leading force In the Guinean and Cape Verdian nationalist
59
movement.
On the basis of a socio-economic analysis of Guinea
and the Cape Verde Islands, and the relations of forces
between the colonizers and the colonial subjects, the Party
determined hdw to make the Guineans and Cape Verdlans aware
of their exploitation and oppression. Led by PAIGC, the
Guineans and Cape Verdlans have also been able to give
smashing blows to Portuguese colonialism, and to Institute
a measure of self-rule In three-fourth's of the forcibly-
freed territory of Guinea-Bissau. And In this, PAIGC avails
Itself of the solidarity and support of socialist countries,
liberal western nations, newly Independent African states,
and non-governmental western organizations.
Given the fact that the relations of forces have been
altered In favor of PAIGC, It appears that the defeat of
Portugal Is Inevitable. Even the assassination of Cabral
(presumably by Portuguese agents), whose consequences has
yet to be studied, does not seem to alter the fate of
Portugal, which Is doomed to failure. The national liberation
movement which Cabral has been able to create and direct Is
greater than him, and will continue until final victory. Such
a victory Is assured by the mass-based strategy and the
favourable external situation which has already altered the
relations of forces In favor of PAIGC.
Although set and determined by Its own backward socio¬
economic conditions, the peasant-based anti-Portuguese
colonialist strategy which PAIGC has been able to adopt may
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significantly influence other anti-colonial and anti-imperia¬
list struggles with similar or like background. Among the
principal strategic principles of FA16C are the strong emphasis
placed on the political education and mobilization of workers
and peasants) the need of establishing guerrilla-liberated
zones in which the peasants become masters of their own
destiny, the necessity of changing a guerrilla war into a
mobile war, and the necessity of surrounding and attacking
the colonial urban centres.
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